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Abstract: How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, but 
objectivity is itself a bias? We argue that objectivity is indeed a bias but an argumentative virtue nonetheless. Using 
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1. Introduction: objectivity, bias, and virtue in argument  
 
How is it possible that objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue and biases are cognitive 
vices, when objectivity itself qualifies as a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity, as a 
character trait, is indeed a kind of bias. However, we do not think that this alters its status as an 
argumentative virtue. Rather, it leads us to rethink whether biases are always vicious. Like many 
biases, as well as many virtues, objectivity’s effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly 
positive. Whether a given character trait will be beneficial in some specific argument depends on 
contingent features of the context, of the argument, and of the goals of the participating arguers. 
However, no single context can determine which traits will be beneficial, nor which ones should 
be cultivated, nor how those descriptive and normative projects are correlated. A broader 
perspective is needed. We believe that virtue argumentation theory (VAT) provides that 
perspective. 
We begin with an analysis of courtroom argumentation as a case study. The assigned 
roles in legal settings provide high-definition examples of how the value of argumentative 
virtues can differ from situation to situation and from role to role. Objectivity, for example, is a 
more important virtue for judges than it is for either the prosecuting or defense attorneys, for 
whom it could have negative consequences. Conversely, bias is a less pernicious vice for defense 
attorneys. Rather, the bias of the defense attorney for his client is an important and necessary part 
of the argumentative machinery at work in the criminal courtroom. It helps ensure that the 
criminal courts reach conclusions of guilt only if reasonable doubts about a defendant’s guilt 
could not be established despite the efforts of someone arguing on her behalf. In this setting, a 
defense attorney’s bias is a virtue. We will use courtroom roles as stand-ins for the variety of 
roles we are all called on to fill in ordinary argumentation. 
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In the next section, we address some general objections to virtue-based argumentation 
theories that are particularly relevant to their application here. Independently, Goddu (2015) and 
Godden (2016) have raised questions about VAT’s foundations and, in consequence, identified a 
problem in how argumentative virtues are identified. If objectivity is only sometimes a positive 
attribute for arguers, is it only sometimes a virtue? If not, what criteria justify its constant status 
as a virtue? If those criteria depend on concepts and values that precede or are independent of the 
virtues, e.g., the concept of a good argument, does that mean virtue theories are superfluous? If 
not, then what connects the designated set of character traits to good argumentation? We take our 
cue from the conventions of courtroom argumentation: those conventions serve both to constitute 
and to regulate legal argumentation and what counts as good legal arguments and legal arguers.1 
The governing conventions for argumentation play a similar dual role, reflecting the co-evolution 
of the concepts of good argumentation and good arguers.2 We argue that, if the ideas of what 
makes an arguer virtuous and what makes and argument good have developed while mutually 
influencing each other, then there is no need (although not necessarily the desire) for conceptual 
bedrock.  
The concluding section returns to the specific cases of bias and objectivity to complete 
the explanation of, and argument for, the claims that objectivity can indeed be a “vicious virtue” 
and biases can be “virtuous vices.”  
 
2. Order in the Court 
 
In one scene in the movie The Bridge of Spies, a Russian spy, having been captured by the 
Americans, sits in his cell and awaits trial. He is talking to his defense lawyer, who has already 
helped him a great deal and thereby gained his trust. The defense lawyer enters the cell and 
offers the spy cigarettes. The spy says, “You’ve never asked me whether the charges were true. 
If I am indeed a spy.” The defense lawyer answers, “This is how we do it: the case against you 
matters. Making them prove it matters. The fiction is, whether you did it or not doesn’t matter. 
The state has to prove it, that you’re a spy.”3 The truth does not matter. He already knows what 
he is going to argue for. He does not know the truth; he does not even want to know the truth. 
And yet, we, the audience, find something admirable in that. 
 How can this be? We assume that in argumentation, objectivity is a virtue and bias a 
vice.4 Yet, here we are, confronted with a situation in which someone clearly displays his bias 
and is clearly disposed to argue based on it, but we cannot bring ourselves to judge him as acting 
according to vicious impulses. It appears to us that he is, in this moment, the person he should 
                                            
1 John Searle’s treatment has become the locus classicus for contemporary use of this distinction: “Regulative rules 
regulate antecedently of independently existing forms of behaviour… constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
create or define new forms of behaviour” Searle (1969, p. 33). 
2 Two comparisons are instructive here: Fricker (2009) reconstructs a genealogy in which an operative concept of 
good informants precedes the concept of knowledge. The relational social (communicative) phenomena enable the 
construction of individual properties. The argumentative theory of reasoning offered in Mercier and Sperber (2011) 
also prioritizes the social-relational aspects of reasoning over individual rationality. We are sympathetic with (and 
grateful for the insights from) both of those endeavors, but we see the emergence of the concepts of virtuous arguer 
and good argument as symbiotic throughout their joint evolution. See section 3 below. 
3 From the screenplay of Bridge of Spies, (Matt Charman, Ethan Coen, Joel Coen, Bridge of Spies, p. 34). 
4 Being biased is generally considered a bad thing. Accordingly, a lot of the research about biases is set out to find 
answers to the question of how we can de-bias ourselves, or how and under which circumstances we can become 
more objective. This is true also of literature dealing with biases and objectivity that is related or makes reference to 
virtues in argumentation. See, e.g. Ballantyne (2015), Zenker (2013), and Howes (2013). 
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be. He signals that, in his role as the Russian spy’s defense lawyer, he will argue with only one 
goal in mind: He will attempt to convince the judge or the jury – his audience – of the innocence 
of his defendant, no matter whether that defendant is guilty. If he enters the courtroom and 
argues with this goal in mind, he will be a clear example of an arguer acting under the influence 
of bias. 
 What does it mean to say that he is biased in arguing? Take the question: “Is the 
defendant guilty?” Suppose she is. We might come to believe in her guilt on the basis of 
evidence, i.e., reasons that directly impact the plausibility that the defendant is guilty. But we can 
also come to this answer for other non-evidential sorts of reasons.5 There are general reasons 
why we might prefer some sorts of conclusions over others, with consequences for individual 
cases, including whether the defendant in a specific case is guilty. A biased arguer can be 
characterized as someone who argues in order to reach conclusions on the basis of antecedent 
preferences.   
On this account, a judge or juror whose answer to the question, “Is the defendant guilty?” 
is partly determined by antecedent preference for one of the two possible answers – “She is” or 
“She is not” – counts as biased. It need not be the sole or even the determining factor in the 
choice of conclusion because there can be degrees of bias, but to the extent that an antecedent 
preference is present and has some effect, the arguer is biased, even if only slightly so. Biases are 
often pernicious, especially when they lead us to prefer conclusions which are most personally 
advantageous. A judge who finds a defendant guilty because he was bribed is the example that 
comes most readily to mind.  But biases can also be benign. Attorneys argue for a defendant’s 
innocence because they are hired to do so. Their retainers make them biased, but not necessarily 
in an objectionable way. Lawyers also take on pro bono cases. They may do so in order to gain 
fame for themselves, out of a sense of duty to society, in pursuit of justice, for noble ethical 
reasons, for ignoble personal reasons, or even just for the intellectual challenge. In all these 
cases, the truth is at best a secondary consideration when it comes to why they argue. A lawyer 
who is quick to offer pro bono services to suspected perpetrators of racial violence might have 
racist motivations of his own – a bias on anyone’s account – but the attorney who automatically 
jumps in to defend the accusers in stereotypical “he said-she said” cases of sexual assault might 
also be described as arguing under a bias. 
This understanding of bias works well with our intuitions about the bad effects bias may 
have on an arguer. Biases may manifest themselves in all aspect of our epistemic agency, from 
data gathering and initial belief formation to subsequent justification and general system 
management, but they become especially visible in arguments. When someone adamantly resists 
good reasons for a conclusion in favor of weaker reasons for a contrary conclusion, we 
justifiably suspect there must be biases at work.6 We tend to distrust those who we think are 
biased. They lose status as epistemic agents, and not just in arguments, but also in offering 
testimony. The mere fact that they disagree is no longer able to lower our confidence in our own 
beliefs.7 This makes sense: We do not think that they disagree with us for reasons directly 
                                            
5 These reasons could be irrational or irrelevant. For example, we might decide someone’s guilt on the basis of a 
strange glint in her eye. However, they do not need to be. Just as simplicity, elegance, utility, or other features that 
are not necessarily indicators of truth may play a role in scientific theory selection, there are factors that will quite 
appropriately influence us in argumentation.  
6 This phenomenon is discussed in, e.g., Ballantyne (2015). 
7 Ballantyne (2015, p. 142). 
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applicable to the subject matter of disagreement – and their reasons for why they might want or 
need to come to some conclusion might not apply to us.  
Objectivity is often associated with a simple lack of biases, but that is problematic for 
those who want to simultaneously criticize the partiality of, say, patriarchal society as well as the 
notion of objectivity itself.8 In one way, objectivity-as-an-absence makes sense. When we are 
being objective, we are not influenced by reasons like our wish to preserve our world-view or 
our striving for personal advantages. But in another way, objectivity is not at all the same as the 
mere absence of bias. The absence of all bias would produce an arguer who does not argue with 
any idea of what kind of conclusion she wants to reach in mind, but instead follows the flow of 
the argument wherever it might lead her. We need a more positive account of what objectivity is. 
After all, the objective arguer is not a blank slate. She approaches arguments with a desired goal 
already in mind, viz. the correct conclusion.9 When it comes to empirical questions, she wants a 
conclusion that will give her a true belief. When it comes to normative questions, she wants to 
reach a conclusion that will give her a good decision. Even in matters where there might not be 
anything like “the correct conclusion,” such as aesthetic questions, the objective arguer can still 
be said to want a correct conclusion, one that will ground an adequate understanding and provide 
an elegant interpretation. She will not be happy with any conclusion that does not fulfill these 
prior desiderata. Not every arguer wants these kinds of conclusions, so any explanation of why a 
given arguer accepts the conclusions she does will refer, to some extent, to the preferences of the 
arguer. Thus, in the broadest sense, then, the objective arguer is biased according to the positive 
account of bias proposed here. Of course, the bias for truth, like its brethren biases for justice, 
goodness, and beauty, happens to be one that we generally do not find objectionable.  
 All that has been said so far serves mostly to re-confirm the idea that objectivity is good, 
bias is bad (and at best benign), and the arguer whose character leads her to be objective in 
argument is virtuous, while the one disposed to bias is vicious. How do we explain our earlier 
confusion? 
 Let us return to our defense lawyer in Bridge of Spies. He is clearly not being objective. 
He will argue in court about an empirical question, the question of guilt, and he will do so for 
non-evidential reasons deriving from the preferences of the legal system. In fact, we assume that 
defense lawyers are usually not objective, and we assume the same of prosecutors. Moreover, we 
routinely believe that lawyers should be biased in these ways. The reasons for this have been 
described vividly, for example, in John B. Mitchell’s half-autobiographical paper “The Ethics of 
the Criminal Defense Attorney – New Answers to Old Questions.”10 There he defends his work 
as a criminal defense attorney, and his commitment to arguing in court with the goal to defend 
even those he knows to be guilty. He justifies himself by referring to the kind of role he plays in 
the criminal justice system. The goal of this system, according to his assessment, is not primarily 
to determine the truth about the guilt of the accused. Rather, it is to treat everyone who enters it 
justly. This includes a preference that gives more value to the acquittal of the innocent than the 
conviction of the guilty.11  
Mitchell’s account illuminates the complementary roles that attorneys play in a system 
built to accomplish justice rather than truth – and the complementary roles for bias and 
objectivity, too. William Blackstone’s principle that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape 
                                            
8 Antony (1992) frames this problem very well. 
9 This understanding of objectivity conforms also to Moira Howes’ concept of objectivity in Howes (2013). 
10 Mitchell (1980). 
11 Mitchell (1980, p. 300). 
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than that one innocent suffer” is the answer that we have adopted for the question of how a just 
system of criminal law should function.12 We have, accordingly, built a bias for the defendant 
into the system. It instructs judges to ask not whether the defendant in a criminal case is guilty, 
but whether she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. That is the question that demands the correct 
conclusion, and that is why and where it is important that judges be objective. 
The trial is set up as an argumentative encounter between an advocate for the defendant’s 
guilt and an advocate for the defendant’s innocence specifically to help the judge and jury 
answer that question correctly. The prosecution’s role is to argue that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt; the defender’s role is to argue that there is reasonable doubt. That is, 
able prosecutors and defenders should be biased arguers: they argue for conclusions determined 
by their role-related preferences, rather than by considerations of truth and falsity.   
 The role our defense-attorney plays in the criminal justice system explains why we do not 
think his bias is a vice. A vice is a character trait that disposes a person to bad actions – either 
actions that regularly have bad consequences, or actions that are regularly motivated by bad 
intentions.13 But that the defense attorney argues with a bias within the context of the criminal 
trial is the result of a preference but not the result of a disposition to act badly. The defense-
attorney’s bias for the innocence of his client furthers the goal of the system of criminal law, to 
ensure that the defendant will be treated justly.14 We may go further: A defense attorney who did 
not display a bias for the conclusion that her client is innocent while arguing in front of the court 
would not fulfill her argumentative role well. An objective defender would hinder, not further 
pursuit of the justice system’s goals. Indeed, even sincerity, letting on that he believes the 
defendant is guilty even though he is arguing against a conviction, would compromise his role as 
a defense attorney. Bias in argument, therefore, turns out not always to be a sign of vice. For 
some of the goals of argumentation, biases are very useful.  
 It is possible to generalize the insight that bias is not necessarily an expression of a 
vicious character. It can be a virtue for an arguer to adopt some kinds of bias when filling certain 
roles at some stages in some arguments – including truth-seeking arguments – because doing so 
can actually serve to further the chances for successful argumentation. For example, feminist 
argumentation theorists have noted that subjecting new ideas and underdeveloped arguments to 
immediate critical scrutiny before they have been fully developed can lead to “premature 
rejection” resulting in the further silencing of marginalized voices.15 These ideas need a defense 
attorney. It can, therefore, be appropriate to adopt an initial, defeasible bias for theses simply 
because they have been suggested by minorities or represent different perspectives, independent 
of, or in addition to considerations of truth, while supporting argumentation develops. As we 
have argued elsewhere, a virtuous arguer will be disposed to adjust how she argues to the context 
of the argument. Forceful adversarial argumentation may be a good way to get to the truth when 
the playing field is level, but that is not always the case. Nor should it always be the case, as 
exemplified by our own virtuously biased criminal justice system.16 
 What this shows is that whether bias or objectivity is advantageous for argumentation 
depends on the context in which we argue and our roles with those arguments. Thus, against our 
                                            
12 Blackstone (1965). 
13 Some accounts tend to treat vice as the absence of virtue, e.g., Aberdein (2016). See, e.g. Battaly (2015) for a 
more positive treatment. 
14 And it is quite possible – and in the case of the attorney’s character in the Bridge of Spies, or in the case of John 
Mitchell – indeed true, that the intention behind this bias is also good. 
15 See, e.g. Moulton (1983) and Gilbert (1994). 
16 See Stevens (2016). 
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first intuition, bias is not always vicious. Furthermore, we can also conclude, as an immediate 
corollary, that objectivity understood as the preference for truth (or goodness, or elegance) over 
all other values is itself a bias. 
 
3. Before virtue 
 
Thus far, we have argued for the claim that objectivity is a more important argumentative virtue 
for judges than it is for prosecuting and defense attorneys, for whom objectivity can even have 
negative value. Embodied in this claim are three theses that generate two important corollaries 
and give rise to one over-arching question. The three explicit theses are:  
 
(T-1) Objectivity is not uniformly valuable for all arguers in all circumstances in 
all arguments.  
 
There is not a lot of news-value here. That’s just how virtues work. Bravery (for unfathomable 
reasons, a favorite example for virtue theorists) is more salient for those who play the role of 
soldiers than those who are shoemakers. 
 
(T-2) In some contexts, objectivity can actually be a negative character trait for 
successful argumentation. 
 
This is a little more interesting, but still not all that conceptually challenging: honesty is a virtue 
for humans, but it is sometimes a burden in our roles as friends, diplomats, merchants, and 
undertakers. 
 However, as we have already indicated, we are committed to arguing that, 
 
(T-3) Objectivity remains a virtue for arguers regardless of its value. 
 
OK, now this should get our attention. Aren’t virtues supposed to be goods – both in themselves 
and instrumentally?17 If objectivity is a virtue for us as arguers, similar to the way that bravery is 
a virtue for us as soldiers, objectivity should be good in arguing just as bravery is good for 
fighting. Otherwise, where is the motivation to be virtuous? The idea of a “detrimental virtue”, if 
not actually self-contradictory, creates tension in the why-be-moral neighborhood.   
The two immediate corollaries are:  
 
 (C-1) The possible dis-utility of objectivity applies to both the process of 
argumentation as well as to individual arguers. 
 
That is, not only can the negative effects of objectivity serve to thwart the various goals of 
individual arguers, objectivity can be a spanner in the works for argumentation. (Consider how 
sincerity can get in the way for proxy arguers, like defense attorneys.) 
 
(C-2) The utility of objectivity is an empirical and contingent matter, both in 
given specific contexts and generally.  
                                            
17 The account of virtues assumed here is heavily informed by Zagzebski (1996) and Annas (2011), particularly for 
their emphases on the need for motivational and acquired components. 
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For all we know, prior to any investigation, objectivity could be detrimental in a preponderance 
of occasions; for that matter, its net, cumulative effects could be negative, too. The feminist 
critique noted earlier of how appeals to objectivity can be used as a weapon that effectively 
silences marginalized voices points to the gravity of this problem.18 
That brings us to the problem of the criterion, the question that has loomed over the 
whole enterprise: 
 
(Q-C) Where do the argumentative virtues come from? What qualifies a character 
trait as an argumentative virtue? 
 
The question is not as much about identifying particular virtues as it is about the need to identify 
the proper criterion to use in identifying the virtues. For example, we have the strong intuition 
that objectivity is a virtue but the discussion of courtrooms shows we need to be able to explain 
why in order to justify it. Several factors make this a particularly pressing problem for virtue-
based theories. First, because argumentative virtues have to bridge the gap from abstract, general 
theorizing to specific applications, they need to be “thick” concepts. The virtues’ normative and 
descriptive components need to be integrated.19 Moreover, the normativity of arguers’ virtues has 
to be connected to the evaluation of their arguments. If there is more to arguments than just their 
illative (inferential) core, as surely there is, then good arguments and good arguers cannot be 
independent concepts. 
What, then, is the direction of dependence? Are the virtues derivative from a prior 
concept of good arguments or are the virtues constitutive of good argumentation? Which has 
conceptual priority? 
The problem of the criterion thus becomes a search for foundations.  
 
(Q-F) What are the foundations for virtue argumentation theories? To put it 
starkly: What comes first: good arguments or good arguers? 
 
If whatever it is that determines the virtues precedes the virtues, i.e., the virtues rest on more 
foundational values, then determining the virtues becomes the wholly empirical job of 
determining which character traits are best suited to bringing about the desired outcomes. While 
that would certainly be a practical, pedagogically useful exercise, it would make VAT 
theoretically eliminable. It would be worthwhile as a valuable heuristic perhaps, but nothing 
more. This would be the case if, as in reliabilism, the concept of a good argument is taken as 
conceptually prior so that it can be used in defining argumentative virtues, which, in turn, are 
constitutive of good arguers. This approach summarily defines out of existence the possibility of 
virtues whose disutility is not the rare exception (which some see as a feature rather than a 
glitch). 
The other option is to take the argumentative virtues as more foundational, so that they 
can be used in defining good arguers on the way to evaluating good arguments and good 
argumentation. Two challenges face this tack. One is how to recover the objective criteria 
normally included in argument evaluation such as premise relevance, inferential validity, and 
                                            
18 Susan Bordo provides an important account of the gendered construction of rationality in Modern philosophy in 
The Flight to Objectivity (Bordo 1987). 
19 For an account of the necessity of “v-principles” for making values as general dispositions action-guiding in 
specific situations, see Thorson (2016). 
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truth. While these factors cannot tell the whole story when it comes to evaluating argumentation, 
they do need to be part of the story. Fortunately, satisfactory stand-ins are available.  
For example, warranted acceptability, as reconstructed by virtue epistemology, can 
replace a realist metaphysics of truth for many purposes, including all the ones pertaining to 
argumentation. There is, to be sure, an obvious and important objection that can be raised 
concerning the “cautionary use” of a truth predicate (“Yes, it’s warranted, but is it really true?”) 
that prevents a complete elimination of objective truth.20 However, that is nothing more than a 
benign corollary of the open-endedness of argumentation (“Yes, your argument seems cogent, 
but does it really prevent all possible future objections?”).  
Similarly, subjective, agent-based reconstructions of objective validity can be offered in 
terms of arguer satisfaction. Again, there is an obvious and important objection to raise 
concerning the possibility of a mistaken consensus: outsiders might see a glaring invalidity that 
insiders cannot. What this objection misses is that once those outside critics engage with the 
argument, they become participants in the argument21 – or, if you prefer, an extension or 
expanded version of the argument. In other words: An outsider who engages with the argument 
by evaluating its validity thereby enters the argument in the role of an interlocutor and becomes 
another arguer22 – and it is no longer true of the argument, now expanded to include the critic, 
that all its participants are satisfied. But couldn’t we all be wrong in judging an argument valid? 
Yes, and should that occur, we may be convinced to revise our judgment; otherwise, our 
judgment will abide. Doesn’t that describe how we do in fact operate? Agent-based theories fare 
a lot better at the job of evaluating the arguments that arguers produce than product-focused 
theories fare at the job of evaluating the arguers who produce them. 
The criterial and foundational questions are connected by common assumptions about the 
nature of argumentation. For starters, there is the felt need for foundations. Now, foundations 
would be required if the goal of argumentation were apodictic demonstrations to ground 
indubitable knowledge. But that is not true of all argumentation. Argumentation covers a broader 
array of intellectual endeavors than that. We have seen this in the example of the criminal court: 
Here, the goal is not to find the objective truth about the guilt of the defendant. If this was the 
case, we would be content to convict innocent people as often as we let guilty people go, as long 
as both happen as little as possible. We would not expect to find a burden of proof on the state as 
heavy as beyond reasonable doubt. However, the goal is to convict those and only those 
defendants about whose guilt we can be absolutely sure – even if that means that we get it wrong 
about guilty defendants slightly more often than otherwise. Within the system of the criminal 
law, the ultimate goal of arguing is not truth; it is justice. The systematic implementation of 
biases helps accomplish this goal. 
Again, if we were to assume that there is a single telos for argumentation, the search for 
grounding becomes a quest for the single criterion that makes an argument good for all situations 
– the Holy Grail of Argumentation Theory – but that assumption cannot be taken for granted. 
Argumentation covers too broad an array of communicative activities for that kind of a one-size-
fits all characterization. Arguers need a wide variety of skills. Good arguers have, in addition, a 
                                            
20 See Kasser and Cohen (2003), partly in response to Allen (1998) and Johnson (1999), for the ineliminable role of 
objective truth. The line of argument follows Putnam’s adaptation of Moore’s open-question argument for the 
irreducibility of goodness (as a metaphysical property) to apply to truth (as a predicate). 
21 Cohen (2013) argues for including critics and spectators among the dramatis personae of arguments. 
22 This effaces the boundary between argument and meta-argument from without, reaching the same place that 
Finocchiaro (2013) reaches from within. 
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correspondingly wide array of virtues that insure they deploy those skills responsibly in pursuit 
of their diverse goals. There are, accordingly, many ways to be a good arguer: winning arguers, 
persuasive arguers, reasonable arguers, effective arguers, responsive arguers, responsible 
arguers, and helpful arguers are all “good” arguers in the contexts that ask for these kinds of 
arguers. The implicit assumptions behind the foundational and criterial question ought to be 
taken off the shelf and put back on the table for discussion, but then, we suggest (while 
apologizing for the mixed metaphor), they need be moved to the back burner. Our proper 
concern is the virtuous arguer in all her shapes and sizes. 
The virtuous arguer is one who is disposed to argue well. Arguing well, we have argued, 
is partially determined by argumentative situations and roles. Good arguers are sensitive to these 
factors and produce their arguments in response. That is, a good argument is produced both 
responsively and responsibly. The good arguer does not always simply aim for the correct 
conclusion. First, they ask themselves – this time objectively – what kind of conclusion they 
should be aiming for. That could be the correct conclusion. But it could also be the thesis that has 
not been seriously considered so far, the judgment they have been hired to advocate for, or the 
claim that will emphasize their piousness. 
Let us return to the courtroom: the skills and properties that make someone a good 
defense attorney are not the same properties that are constitutive of good prosecutors, good 
judges, good jurors, or good legal theorists. Nor are they necessarily the same as those of good 
collegiate debaters, good partisan advocates, good negotiators, or, casting the net more widely, 
good Talmudic pilpul or Buddhist, gelukpa arguers. More instructive is the contrast between 
what counts as arguing well in, say, the English common law or American civil law traditions 
with arguing well within the traditions of Islamic sharia courts or Catholic ecclesiastical 
inquisitions. In the latter, piety, deference to authority, and textual knowledge are prominent 
virtues; open-mindedness is not. The conventions that govern how we argue in those different 
contexts have evolved in different ways; so have the criteria for what counts as good arguing; 
and so, too, have the relevant argumentative virtues, i.e., what constitutes being a good arguer. 
The evolution of argumentation traditions involves a co-evolution of the concepts of good 
arguments and good arguers, so asking what comes first is less like a chicken-and-egg question 
than a mountain-and-valley one.  
 
4. Conclusion: getting it right 
 
We began with the common assumption that biases are always vicious. That appears to create a 
problem because with a sufficiently general understanding of what constitutes bias – any 
effective antecedent preferences for some sorts of conclusions over others – it turns out that 
objectivity counts as a bias. Since biases can have good effects, as shown by the actors in legal 
argumentation, it should not have to give us any pause to think of objectivity as a bias – except 
for the fact that the discussion also showed how objectivity can have negative effects. Thus, 
either virtues can be negative or objectivity is not a virtue. We do want to maintain that 
objectivity remains a virtue even in those cases where it has negative value.  
 If objectivity had negative value only now and then, that would not be particularly 
worrisome because virtues are dispositional character traits that need not be active or effective at 
all times, and their occasional harmfulness could be justified by a consequentialist argument 
from their generally reliable performance and their overall value. That route makes objectivity’s 
status as a virtue an empirical and contingent matter, and it also confronts us with the 
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foundational and criterial problems for virtue argumentation theory. The solution to those 
problems – the co-evolution of the concepts of good arguers and good argumentation – also 
answers the question how objectivity can be a virtue regardless of its effects. 
 One of the lessons learned from considering the distinct roles in courtrooms is that 
different situations call for different kinds of good arguers. Criminal trials are just one 
idiosyncratic kind of argument. Had the protocols and conventions of courtroom argumentation 
evolved differently, objectivity could have taken a back seat to speculative creativity (as in 
argumentation in literary criticism), ideological orthodoxy and commitment (as in partisan 
political argumentation), or sensitivity and empathy (as in some forms of therapy). Nevertheless, 
objectivity does have a privileged – but not inviolable – place in argumentation. 
As legal argumentation has evolved in the ways it has, a commitment to “getting it right” 
remains important. Even though justice may be a more important value, that is not to say that 
objectivity is not also tremendously important. On the contrary! To say, “You’re not even trying 
to get it right!” is to charge someone with the argumentative equivalent of a mortal sin. It is a 
serious charge, but is a charge that seems to be serious no matter the kind of argument and no 
matter the ultimate values in effect. Objectivity is a wild card that can always be played. But it is 
not a trump card that always wins. It is a virtue, but its status as a virtue is not tied to its 
consequences. Instead, it is wrapped up in what makes an argument, what it is to argue well, and 
what it is to be a good arguer – namely, an arguer who fulfills her role in the argumentative 
situation in which she finds herself, by arguing for the conclusion she objectively should be 
arguing for 
We think we got that right. 
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